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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the claim that the land rental market can be an effective means of 
redistributing access to, if not ownership of, land to the rural poor, using Paraguay as our model. 
The land sales market is also examined. The land rental market in Paraguay’s rural areas is 
found to be very thin, due at least in part to a lack of available credit for inputs. Renting-in 
substantial amounts of land is found to contribute significantly to household per-capita income. 
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  11.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The staggering inequality of access to land in Paraguay,
1 coupled with some of the highest 
poverty rates in Latin America, lend urgency to the study of the land market in Paraguay. There 
is general agreement that a primary means for alleviating rural poverty is access to land. Land 
conflicts are another motivation: the unrest, violence, and suffering associated with them could 
be eliminated by redistributing land (Deininger 2003). And the stylized fact of the inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity means that redistributing land can increase 
overall welfare by increasing overall production. 
The inverse relationship between land productivity and farm size raises the question of why 
the land market has not redistributed land to more efficient farmers. Proposed answers have 
usually taken the form, in theoretical work, of looking at the imperfections in actual land 
markets, such as information asymmetry, transactions costs, unclear property rights, credit 
rationing, and linked credit and input markets. The World Bank has in recent years focused on 
making the land sales market work “properly” as a means of alleviating rural poverty (Deininger 
and Binswanger 1999). Policy prescriptions have included land titling, market-assisted land 
reform (grants given to landless peasants to buy land), and land banks with credit assistance. The 
World Bank has emphasized land titling as a precursor to functioning land markets in its funded 
projects, however. The argument for titling is that it clarifies property rights, thus enabling the 
land market to function more freely. 
Part of the packages of structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and the World 
Bank has been the removal of laws limiting the buying, selling, and renting of land. This has met 
with mixed results throughout Latin America. The distribution of land in Paraguay is highly 
unequal, and the land sales market suffers from all the impediments (lack of clear property 
rights, high transactions costs, lack of access to credit) noted in the literature on the subject. Can 
land rental markets effectively redistribute land and reduce poverty?  And, have rental markets 
been effective at redistributing access to land?  My hypothesis is that they cannot and have not. I 
now briefly review the extensive recent literature on land market reform policies, the literature 
on land rental markets, and on the history of Paraguayan agricultural policy. Then, I outline the 
                                                 
1The Gini coefficient for operational land holdings for 2001 is 0.847 (calculated using MECOVI, 2000–2001 data, 
see Table 1). 
  2data and methodology I use to study the land markets, present my results, and provide some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.   LITERATURE  REVIEW 
 
Generally speaking, the microeconomic theory of competitive markets has little to say about 
agricultural land markets. Perfectly competitive markets require a homogeneous good, free entry 
and exit for buyers and sellers, enough buyers and sellers so that no one buyer or seller can 
influence the market price, and complete and perfect information (of the present and future) for 
all participants. Land sales and rental markets fall far short of this mark. Land is certainly not a 
homogeneous good—it varies with geology, geography, and climate. Information about land is 
unevenly collected and distributed. Information about buyers and sellers (important especially in 
rental markets) is rarely complete. Entry and exit are not free in many instances, and in many 
areas the potential buyers far outnumber potential sellers, giving the latter considerable market 
power (Muñoz 1999).  
Neither are the competitive market theory’s implications for land sales market outcomes 
observed. Given a competitive market, land will be transferred from less to more efficient users. 
If there were homogeneous technology and homogeneous farmers, at the market equilibrium, all 
farms would operate identical amounts of land (determined by the efficient scale for the 
technology). If we allow for heterogeneity of farming skill and land quality, we would have an 
optimal distribution of different-sized operational holdings. Within this optimal distribution, 
efficiency would not vary once the variations in farmer skill and land quality were controlled for 
(Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995). Yet, there is a large and growing literature that 
documents an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity throughout much of the 
world. 
The inverse relationship and skewed land distributions imply at least two possible critiques 
of the competitive market theory vis-à-vis land markets. The first is that the land market, though 
working “properly,” is not bringing about the expected outcome, and so the theory is incorrect. 
The second implication is that the land market is not working properly. If we accept the latter, 
then if the market could be made to function perfectly, it would redistribute land to the more 
efficient, smaller farmers, enhancing both equity and efficiency. This possibility has gained 
popularity in light of the widespread failure of government imposed solutions (such as 
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and Ickowitz  2002). These failures are taken to prove that the state cannot address the problem 
and so the market is the last bastion of hope for equitable redistribution. 
Those calling for market-oriented land reforms run the gamut from fervent free-marketeers 
to more cautious advocates of some qualified land market policy prescriptions. Many of the 
suggested reforms, though, focus on making the land market perform ”better,” that is, more 
efficiently. These reforms include titling, registration, cadastral surveys, and land information 
databases that are free and open, all in the interest of reducing transactions costs. There is an 
implicit assumption that getting markets as close to perfect as possible is equivalent to providing 
the means to the best outcome possible. This can not be the case even if perfect markets were to 
bring about the best outcome. The land market can never be “perfect” because of the 
heterogeneous nature of land itself. In addition, owning land brings benefits that cannot be 
measured simply in the value of output brought to market. Prestige, social status, political 
power, economic power, and the inherently unmeasurable satisfaction of a connection to the 
earth are benefits that do not easily fit into the neoclassical framework, even the modified 
framework that includes market imperfections. 
Some other reforms aim towards enabling those disadvantaged in the land market to engage 
in it more effectively, thereby leveling the playing field. Examples of this type of reform include 
provision of credit for land purchases and for inputs, and creating a transparent land conflict 
adjudication process. These types of reforms tend to be more costly and to have more political 
opposition. As such, they are less likely to be enacted, due to certain real world conditions that 
present real obstacles. In many contexts, neoliberal policies, with their emphasis on a smaller, 
less interventionist state, reign supreme. In fact, most countries with high levels of rural poverty 
that might think about initiating land market reforms are characterized by the dominance of the 
neoliberal agenda, due to either externally-imposed structural adjustment, the internal political 
power of comprador elites, or both.  
The World Bank has made efforts at land policy a centerpiece of its rural poverty alleviation 
program, both in theory and practice. The current land policy consensus of the World Bank rests 
on four principles. First, family owned and operated farms are desirable on both efficiency and 
equity grounds. Second, secure land property rights are essential for eliciting effort, promoting 
investment, and providing the basis for land market transactions. Third, the policy and 
regulatory environment should promote the transfer of land from less to more efficient uses. And 
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an alternative to state-initiated land reforms, due to an ideological shift that brought focus back 
to markets and away from states, which were blamed for the failure of redistributive land reform 
efforts. A major change in focus for the World Bank since its 1975 Land Reform Policy 
document is that land rental markets are now seen as more equitable and efficient than land sales 
markets where other markets (most notably, credit markets) are imperfect (Deininger 2003). 
Thus, what would be considered a second-best solution if other markets were working is now 
considered the first-best solution given the current context. 
Turning to the impact of nonland market imperfections on the ability of land markets to 
redistribute land to poorer, more efficient farmers, the structure of the rural labor market makes 
the small or landless peasant more competitive, while the credit market and the insurance market 
(or lack thereof) impose constraints on small and landless peasants to participate in the land 
market. I’ll briefly review each of these effects.  
Rural labor markets are often imperfect. Agricultural wages are frequently lower than 
peasants could make working their own farm (i.e., their average product). Often this implies that 
family labor is used most intensively by small farmers, but this labor market imperfection also 
implies that land rental markets will improve the welfare of landless peasants by providing an 
opportunity to increase their incomes (Deininger 2003). 
Small farms are likely to have a competitive advantage in land markets. They are more 
efficient and have a greater demand for land than large landowners, but the ability to capitalize 
on this advantage is likely to be reduced by credit markets that are imperfect (Carter and 
Zimmerman 2000). A well-functioning credit market is essential for the land sales and rental 
markets to perform well for two important reasons. First, because of the long time gap between 
incurring the costs of inputs and receiving the revenues from sales of the output, credit enables 
farmers to cushion consumption, as well as to purchase inputs to production. If credit for 
operating costs is scarce, then the incentive to increase land holdings is greatly reduced. This 
first effect is important for both sales and rental markets. Second, in the absence of large 
savings, credit is required for making land purchases. Without it, no sales are going to happen. 
Since credit markets are notoriously imperfect in rural regions worldwide, land sales markets 
will be handicapped in their ability to redistribute land. Thus, credit market reforms should be, 
but seldom are, an integral part of most proposals for reforming land markets. Of course, 
traditional redistributive land reforms went some distance towards easing the input and 
  5consumption credit constraint (as well as the land pressure) since they provided farmers with 
collateral. 
Finally, insurance markets also play an important role in agriculture. Because output depends 
on that most uncontrollable of variables, the weather, some form of crop insurance is desirable. 
Insurance is notoriously scarce in poor rural areas. Even if land sales markets work well, 
imperfect credit and insurance markets will lead to greater land concentration (Carter and 
Zegarra 1999). Local agricultural economies are characterized by covariate risk due to localized 
factors such as climate and disease. This leads to covariance of incomes within regions. Land is 
both a store of wealth and a form of collateral. Since land is used as collateral in loans for 
working capital, however, land purchases must be financed out of savings. Thus, in the absence 
of insurance markets, good years may be characterized by general ability to buy but 
unwillingness to sell, while bad years may be characterized by inability to buy. Consecutive bad 
years will increase the number of sales, but moneylenders or large landholders will buy these 
plots, since other farmers have little or no savings with which to buy (Binswanger, Deininger, 
and Feder 1995). Thus, imperfections in markets for labor, credit, and insurance will have 
profound impacts on the functioning of both the land sales and land rental markets. But 
government policies also have an impact. 
Policy can make markets work better or worse and can produce increases or decreases in 
equity and efficiency. Most of the literature focuses on the effects of policy on the functioning of 
the land market itself. These effects can be divided into those that directly affect the price of 
land and those that affect transactions costs. Many policy options can lead land prices to exceed 
the present value of the income to be derived from ownership. Credit subsidies may have the 
perverse effect of increasing land prices. Lower taxes on agricultural income may increase the 
price of land as well (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995). 
Cadastral surveys, registration, and titling enhance the functioning of the land sales and 
rental markets in a number of ways. They reduce asymmetric information by increasing the 
amount of information about particular parcels that is public knowledge, making land more 
easily transferable and more valuable as collateral (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995). 
Registries can provide verification of ownership to buyers and sellers. This security enhances the 
incentive to improve land. Titling can enable large landholders to control more land, however, 
leading to greater land concentration. Thus, titling programs need to be well-publicized, so that 
everyone knows the rules and they should be systematic, not subject to the demands of a portion 
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area, since titling can effectively transfer land to those with the money or influence to pay for 
titles with bribes or favors. Transparency is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to alleviate 
this concern. 
The deck seems stacked in many areas against the poor being able to purchase land. If the 
poor cannot buy land, can land rental markets lead to an efficient and equitable distribution of 
operational land holdings?  I now review the theoretical and empirical basis for promoting land 
rental markets as an avenue for improving rural welfare. 
Theoretically, land rental markets have several advantages over land sales markets, both on 
equity and efficiency grounds. They allow greater flexibility to transfer use of land to more 
efficient producers with relatively low transactions costs. They are less vulnerable to credit 
market imperfections. Peasants don’t need as much credit to rent land. The problem of securing 
credit to purchase inputs still remains, but the cost of land purchase need not be borrowed 
(Deininger and Binswanger 1999; Deininger 2003). The lack of credit markets for inputs is one 
obstacle to small and landless peasants’ buying land of their own. If small landowners can’t get 
credit for working capital, how and on what terms will a renter get credit for inputs?  Some types 
of rental contracts including inputs might be used to offset this lack of credit (Sadoulet, Murgai, 
and de Janvry 2001). 
Finally, land rentals may be one rung in an “agricultural ladder” out of landless wage labor 
up to land ownership. While renting land, farmers may be able to save enough to buy land of 
their own, while gaining valuable experience that will enable them to farm successfully when 
they do become owners (Sadoulet, Murgai, and de Janvry  2001).  
Some disadvantages of land rental contracts include a lack of incentives to work hard, 
improve the land, or use inputs. A tenant may not work as hard or use the same level of inputs if 
some of their output is going to someone else. A tenant with a short term contract has a short 
time horizon for planning and decision making and thus, is much less likely to make investments 
in soil quality and conservation than an owner of a similar plot. However, these contracts are 
used virtually everywhere, so perhaps they are an efficiency-enhancing solution to problems of 
credit constraints, risk, and “low” incentives (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995). 
Theoretical models lend support to this argument. 
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wage variety) in which tenants choose effort to maximize utility and landlords choose the 
number of tenants and the type of contract to maximize income. Under conditions of certainty 
and perfect enforceability of contracts, all contracts yield equivalent outcomes. But, if we allow 
imperfect enforceability, fixed rent contracts dominate. Under uncertainty, a share contract will 
trade off risk for effort, providing partial insurance for the tenant. If the model is extended to 
multiple periods, reputation effects lower tenant shirking and landlord cheating (Binswanger, 
Deininger, and Feder 1995). However, the latter is a dubious claim, given the common rural land 
market structure of oligopolistic (if not monopolistic) landlords facing numerous poor (and often 
desperate) peasants. 
In the Latin American context, rental contracts have traditionally been viewed as linked to 
the old, exploitative hacienda system. Thus, the motives for restrictions on land rental markets 
have been to reduce exploitation. These restrictions have included rent ceilings and land to the 
tiller redistributive reforms. Many of these types of reforms have actually led to worsening 
conditions (dried up rental markets, for example) for the landless peasantry. Thus, replacing 
these restrictions with clear regulations could increase productivity and welfare (as has been 
done in many cases of neoliberal land market reforms), argue Deininger and Binswanger (1999).  
Empirical work on land rental markets remains somewhat scarce for Latin America. Most of 
the attention to date has focused on land sales. However, the evidence so far is not encouraging. 
A new study of rural land rental markets in Nicaragua finds that, despite reforms in 1995, rental 
markets were not only not effective in redistributing land to smaller, more efficient farmers, the 
reforms enacted in Nicaragua actually increased tenure insecurity and decreased productivity. 
Throughout Latin America, the evidence suggests that land rental markets are constrained by 
weak property rights and ineffective conflict resolution institutions (Deininger, Zagarra, and 
Lavadenz 2003). 
Deininger, Zagarra, and Lavadenz (2003) find that land rental markets are having some 
equalizing effect on the operational distribution of land in Nicaragua, but are far from achieving 
total equalization. Since they also find a significant negative relationship between operational 
holdings and agricultural profits, it is clear that better-working land rental markets would 
increase overall productivity and equity in Nicaragua. Their work also points to the importance 
of tailoring policy to the context in question for the best hope of achieving positive outcomes.  
  Land rentals could possibly redistribute land access, if not land ownership. The 
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mechanism, when compared with land sales markets. Carter and Salgado (2001) find that 
Paraguayan land rental markets are allowing some land access to poor and landless peasants. I 
now move on to discuss the development of agricultural policy in Paraguay from the 1960s to 
the 1990s. 
 
3.   PARAGUAYAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
 
In the early 1960s, the great challenge facing Paraguayan agriculture was the great congestion in 
the Central Region, the area immediately surrounding Asunción. The Agrarian Statute of 1963 
(Ley 854) aimed to change the country’s agrarian structure. The Instituto Bienestar Rural (IBR), 
created by another law (Ley 852) in the same year, was charged with eliminating the 
minifundia/latifundia system and replacing it with a “just system of ownership, tenure, and land 
exploitation.” The IBR started its work by initiating a colonization program in eastern Paraguay 
(Zoomers 1988). The IBR settled tens of thousands of families on newly-opened state lands, but 
lack of infrastructure, roads, credit, and access to markets meant that there was little progress in 
exploiting the colonized lands (Baer and Birch 1984). 
The results of the colonization program were mixed. New roads into the east and south from 
Asunción and the bridge over the Paraná River meant that access to markets slowly improved. In 
the 1970s, the new roads brought waves of immigrants flowing from Brazil, Argentina, and 
Japan into the eastern frontier area and boosted Paraguayan economic growth. The settlers grew 
soy and cotton for export (Baer and Birch 1984), but the government, after setting up schools 
and hospitals in the colonized areas, cut back support. The “pioneers” reproduced the dual 
agrarian structure of the old Minifundia zone, but the colonization effort did greatly increase the 
number of farmers and the amount of land under cultivation (Weisskoff 1992). 
Paraguayan colonists, as opposed to immigrants, were not substantially better off in the 
colonized areas than they had been in their old homes. In the Central Region, little changed, 
since most of those who left had small plots and there were no radical land reforms undertaken. 
Many stayed behind because they had diversified activities that allowed them greater income 
than could be had farming alone, which was the only option in the colonies (Zoomers 1988). 
In addition to colonization, the IBR was also empowered to expropriate and redistribute 
latifundias (properties larger than 20,000 hectares in the Chaco and larger than 10,000 hectares 
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minifundias. The IBR also devised a program of granting titles to those occupying state lands. 
However, the titling program was not well thought out in practice and so did not produce much 
in the way of agricultural modernization. The expropriation process was carried out with little 
vigor (Zoomers 1988). 
At the end of the 1980s, the frontier was effectively closed. This meant that one of the 
attractors for the excess population from the Minifundia zone was gone (the other was the urban 
industrial and informal sectors). Thus, in the early 1990s, pressure for land heated up in the 
Minifundia zone, as well as in the Colonization zones. The most heated struggles for land, 
however, were erupting in the modernized frontier zone, where peasant differentiation was 
greatest, while land rents and prices were rising sharply (Carter and Galeano 1995). 
Little changed in Paraguayan agricultural policy with the democratization process that began 
after the ouster of Stroessner in 1989. The moves that were made, even when proclaimed to be in 
the service of progress for the marginalized rural populations, were mere continuations of 
Stroessnerite agricultural policy, favoring large landholders, cattle ranchers, and Colorado Party 
favorites. For example, in 1993, as a result of a 1991 consultation with a FIDA delegation, el 
Fondo de Desarrollo Campesino (FDC) began operations. The contemporary national rural 
credit organizations (el Banco Nacional de Fomento [BNF], el Fondo Ganadero [FG], and el 
Crédito Agricola de Habilitación [CAH]), were not eligible to receive FIDA funding because 
they did not effectively include the rural population and because of excessive administrative 
costs. Unlike BNF and CAH, which did not loan to small peasants, the FDC was specifically set 
up to address the credit needs of the smaller peasantry in Paraguay using FIDA funds. However, 
in practice, only about 40% of funds went to actual agricultural credit, with the rest swallowed 
up in high administrative costs (González 1997). 
What has been the effect of this history on Paraguayan land markets?  The most detailed 
study of Paraguayan land markets to date is Carter and Galeano’s Campesinos, Tierra, y 
Mercado (1995). Its focus is on the land sales market, but it provides some analysis of the land 
rental market as well. In Paraguay, due to the historical context summarized above, tenure 
structure varies greatly by region. Based on a 1991 survey of 300 farms carried out in three 
departments (Paraguarí, representing the Minifundia zone, Itapúa, the Frontier zone, and San 
Pedro, the Colonization zone) they find that in San Pedro, there were no farmers renting or 
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renting or share-cropping land (Carter and Galeano 1995). 
The pressure for land is getting greater with time due to the aforementioned processes of 
minifundization in the Minifundia and Colonization zones, and, most ferociously, differentiation 
in the Frontier zone. This increasing pressure implies that there is great demand among the small 
and landless peasants for land, and so the rental and sales markets could conceivably provide an 
outlet. However, Carter and Galeano find that, despite being competitive in the land market 
(having a high demand and willingness to pay a reasonable price), small peasants are kept out of 
the land market by land market segmentation (large landowners sell and rent to each other, not 
small or landless campesinos) and credit market limitations (Carter and Galeano 1995). In 
addition, some farm characteristics make it likelier that a farmer will want to rent land in. In 
their study of Paraguayan panel data from 1991 and 1994, Carter and Salgado (2001) found that 
those farmers with a high land/labor ratio were likeliest to be renting out, while those with a low 
land/labor ratio were likeliest to be renting in. 
This paper endeavors to assess whether any progress has been made in the 1990s from the 
rather grim beginning of 1991. The government of Paraguay has done little to address the 
problem of land pressure from small and landless peasants, beyond continuing the slow process 
of granting title to occupants of state-owned lands through the IBR and carrying forward a 
general land titling program. Thus, hopes of the situation having reversed itself are slim. 
 
4.   DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This essay used the 1991 Censo Agropecuario and the 2000–2001 Mejoramiento de las 
Encuestas de Hogares y la Medición de Condiciones de Vida (MECOVI) survey. These datasets 
contain rich information about land tenure (including gender, in the latter case), farm 
management, and production. I take a random sample of 1% of farms in the census data, which 
gives me roughly 3,000 farms, similar to the number of rural farms in the MECOVI survey. 
For this study, I follow the method of Deininger, Zagarra, and Lavadenz’s (2003) study of 
land markets in Nicaragua. I begin with a descriptive analysis of land markets. I investigate the 
incidence of sales by farm size category in the two periods. This will tell us who is buying and 
who is selling land in each period. I expect to find that the land sales market is segmented: large 
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sell small plots. Then I examine the incidence of land rental by farm size category. This will 
indicate who is renting in and who is renting out in each period. The rental market should 
theoretically be less segmented than the sales market, and generally more accessible. I also 
compare the operational distribution of land with the ownership distribution in each period. This 
comparison will give a first approximation of the effect of the land rental market on the 
distribution of land in Paraguay. 
Next, I regress household income (for the 2001 data only) on tenure variables. This will test 
the benefits of participation in rental markets, versus ownership and landlessness. The point here 
is that rental markets are being offered as possibly a better solution to rural poverty than the 
sales markets. I expect to find that rental does not improve household income relative to 
ownership or agricultural wage labor. Another argument is that land rental provides an 
agricultural ladder—an intermediate rung between agricultural wage labor and land ownership. 
Thus, I test farm income on tenure variables as well. I expect to find little advantage in rental 
over land occupation, for example. 
Finally, I examine the determinants of buying, selling, and renting land in and out. I expect 
to find: that credit availability affects rental as well as sales markets; that the sex of the 
household head affects participation in the land markets; and that the former effect has grown 
stronger over time. This latter result is expected because, over the course of the 1990s, Paraguay 
has carried out financial liberalization, which has led to dwindling credit availability (Gibson 
and Molinas 1998). This combination of static and dynamic effects will give a rich picture of the 
evolving functioning of the land market in Paraguay in the late 1990s. 
 
5.   LAND MARKETS 
 
Table 1 presents both the operational and ownership Gini coefficients for 1991 and 2001. In 
addition, Lorenz curves of ownership and operational landholdings in 1991 and 2001 are 
presented in Figures 1–4.
2  In each period, operational holdings are more equally distributed than  
                                                 
2I use the method suggested by Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz (2002), adjusting per capita land holdings by soil 
quality. Data on access to water is available only for 1991, so neither period is adjusted for water access. The 
sample I use, however, is all rural households for both ownership and operational holdings, since I want to estimate 
the impact of land rental markets on the distribution of access to land. 
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did in 1991. This may indicate that the rental markets are operating less well than they did in 
1991, or that other sources of land access for small farmers (land occupations, for example) are 
no longer possible. 
Tables 2–4 show the number and the median and maximum size and owned land of rural 
farms in the two periods and the four regions under consideration in this essay.
3  The difference 
between the beginning of the 1990s and the end seems dramatic—in 2001, the maximum overall 
farm size is a little more than one tenth of what it was in 1991. This difference may be due to the 
samples drawn for each year. However, the median farm size also shrank in all but the 
Minifundia region (though it shrank by only 7% in the Colonization region). In the Central 
region, the median farm size is less than one half hectare in 2001, while this region was the only 
one that saw the maximum farm size increase. Land ownership is similarly changed—the 
median farm owned over three times as much land in 1991 as in 2001. The differences among 
regions are also pronounced. The median farm in the Central region is the smallest and owns the 
least land in both 1991 and 2001. In 1991, the Frontera region has the highest median farm size 
and land owned, but the Colonization region is largest in both categories in 2001. The median 
farm in the Central region was one quarter the size of the median farm in the Frontera region in 
1991, and one-fourteenth the size of the median farm in the Colonization region in 2001. While 
the median farms in the Central and Frontera regions shrank both in terms of farm size and land 
owned between 1991 and 2001, the median farms in the Minifundia and Colonization regions 
remained largely unchanged. All regions except the Central region saw remarkable decreases in 
the maximum farm size and land owned over the same period. 
The only land transaction comparisons possible between the two periods are those involving 
renting land in (Table 5). The incidence of land rentals is considerably lower in 2001, but the 
average size is more than three times as great. Regionally this pattern shows up most starkly in 
the Colonization region, which has less than half the rentals, but the average size is fourteen 
times as large in 2001. By region, the demand for rentals is least active in the Central region, 
which has one quarter the number of rentals as the Minifundia region in 2001, and the lowest 
average size (under two hectares). In terms of renting land out and of buying and selling land, 
the Central region is also the least active in 2001 (see Table 6). It has the smallest number of 
                                                 
3Since both land ownership and farm size are very unequally distributed, I report the median, rather than the 
average, farm size and area owned. 
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has a slightly lower average amount of land bought). The Minifundia and Frontera regions are 
the most active in terms of number of transactions, but the Colonization region has the largest 
average size of land sales. 
Most farms in Paraguay are relatively small, and the percentage of farms that are small has 
increased: in 1991, 40% of farms were less than five hectares in size, while in 2001, 51% were 
(see Table 7).
4  In 1991, 75% of the farms were between one and twenty hectares in size, while 
in 1991, this share is down to 67%. Part of the explanation is the change in rental market 
participation. While in 1991, 49% of the farms with less than one hectare rented land in, by 2001 
the participation rates were 10.6% (see Tables 8 and 9). Size categories larger than one hectare, 
in most cases, saw increased renting in of land, in terms of either participation, average amount 
of land rented in, or both. Most of the incidence of renting land out was concentrated in farms 
between one and fifty hectares in 2001, although the greatest participation rates were found 
among farms between five and 100 hectares (see Tables 10 and 11). Similarly, most of the 
purchases and sales of land were concentrated among farms with less than fifty hectares. For 
sales market transactions, though, the largest farms had the highest participation rates. It is hard 
to see from the evidence presented here how the land rental market could be contributing 
significantly to land redistribution. However, it is worth noting that the smallest farmers are four 
times as likely to rent in land as purchase it.  
 
6.   LAND MARKET PARTICIPATION 
 
In this section, I test the determinants of participation in land markets. I hypothesize that 
potential rental market participants suffer from similar constraints as potential sales market 
participants—lack of access to credit. This argument is not as straightforward as the argument 
for sales markets, but in order for a campesino to feel confident enough to enter into a rental 
contract for land, he or she must know that the inputs needed to farm effectively will be within 
reach. This is where a lack of access to credit can be a binding, if indirect, constraint. This 
constraint is, in fact, in operation in Paraguay—the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería has 
                                                 
4For the farm size categories, I use the total operated area for Table 7 only; for all other tables in this section, I use 
the current area operated plus land that was rented out or sold minus land rented in or bought. This pretransaction 
farm size enables me to get a clear picture of who is renting or selling how much land. 
  14found its ability to promote cotton production limited, even though it is distributing free seed. 
The reason is that farmers will not take seed since they have no access to credit for other 
associated inputs (EIU 2001). 
Figures 5–8 provide a visual impression of land rental markets in Paraguay over the decade 
of the 1990s. The first two figures provide fitted values from nonparametric regressions of rental 
demand on the amount of land owned per adult household member in 1991 and 2001.
5  Both 
demand regressions slope upward. This seems counterintuitive, since a high owned land to labor 
ratio should lead to lower demand and because we have observed that efficiency falls as farm 
size increases. The second two figures provide fitted values from nonparametric regressions of 
rental supply and net rental on land owned per adult household member in 2001. We would 
expect the net land rentals to fall as land owned per adult household member rises, but we see it 
rising then falling back to zero. The sales market seems to behave more as we would expect (see 
Figures 9–11). Although the demand for land again rises with land owned, the net purchases 
decline (though only after 250 hectares per adult household member). While nonparametric 
regressions such as these give a feel for the data, they cannot test the significance of the 
relationship they depict. So, I proceed to a more standard regression analysis of the land rental 
and sales markets. 
I test the determinants of participation in land markets in two ways: both the fact of and the 
extent of participation. Thus, I use both dummy variables for participation and the amount of 
land rented, sold, etc. I use Logit regressions for each of the four dependent dummy variables: 
Sold, Bought, RentedOut, and RentedIn. The specification for the Logit regressions, using 








where numadult is the number of adult household members, preOW is the amount of land owned 
prior to transactions (in hectares), age is the age of the household head, female_head is a dummy 
variable taking one for households with a single female head of household, land_credit is a 
                                                 
5Following Deininger, Zagarra, and Lavadenz (2003). 
  15dummy variable indicating that the household received credit for purchasing land (used only in 
the regression of Bought), input_credit is a dummy variable indicating that the household 
received credit for purchasing inputs to production, capital_credit is a dummy variable 
indicating that the household received credit for purchasing capital equipment, farmAssets is the 
value of the productive assets that the household owns, in millions G, Titled is a dummy variable 
indicating that the household has secure title for land that it owns, and front, colon, and cent are 
dummy variables for the Frontier, Colonization, and Central regions, respectively. The estimated 
coefficients resulting from the maximum likelihood estimation of the Logit model are 
interpreted as increasing or decreasing the likelihood of buying, selling, renting in, or renting out 
land, respectively. 
I use Tobit regressions, rather than ordinary least squares (OLS), for each of the four 
continuous dependent variables, AreaSold, AreaBought, AreaRentedOut, and AreaRentedIn, 
since many farms in the sample do not participate in the land sales and rental markets, and thus, 
are censored at zero. Tobit analysis applies maximum likelihood estimation to dependent 
variables that are censored. The resulting estimated coefficients have properties similar to OLS 
estimated coefficients if the sample size is sufficiently large. The sample size in this analysis is 
large enough to allow interpretation of the estimates as though they were OLS estimates. The 
specification for the Tobit regressions I run are identical to that in Equation 1, above. 
Tables 12–13 provide summary statistics for the regression variables I use in this analysis. 
One striking difference is that the average farm is over twice as large in 1991 as in 2001, while 
the average rural farm household owned less than a third of the land in 2001 as the average in 
1991. While in 1991, 12.5% of the farms were tenants, only 8.5% were in 2001. The average 
size of rentals in 2001 was more than double that of 1991. Also, while in 1991, 9.7% of 
households were female-headed, in 2001 over 19.8% of households were. The percentage of 
farms receiving some kind of credit assistance dropped from over 34% of farm households in 
1991 to less than 8.4% in 2001. Over 60% of farms held title to land in 1991, but only 36.7% did 
in 2001. The regression results are presented in Tables 14–23. Note that the 1991 agricultural 
census data contains information only about land rented in. So, for land rented out, land 
purchases, and sales, only regressions for 2001 are presented. In addition, the regressions for 
selling and renting out land include only those households that owned land, eliminating about 
one thousand households from the sample. 
  16Unfortunately, there are no easy methods to assess the relative merits of different 
specifications with Logit or Tobit analysis. I compare χ2 statistics for lack of a better method. I 
begin with the land sales market. Except for the inclusion of the sex of the household head and 
credit, this follows the model used in the Nicaragua study (Deininger, Zagarra, and Lavadenz 
2003). Notice first that for both incidence and amount of land sold, the prior amount of land 
owned is a significant positive contributor to participation. Since one must have land in order to 
sell it, this result makes sense. In the case of the survey Logit regression of selling land (Table 
14), it is the only significant contributor. For the Tobit regression of the amount of land sold 
(Table 15), access to input credit assistance significantly reduces the amount of land sold (by an 
estimated forty-eight hectares!). Farm assets also significantly reduce the amount of land sold by 
about two hectares per million G in assets. Farmers in regions other than the Minifundia region 
sold significantly more land.  
On the demand side of the 2001 land sales market, different factors appear to be important. 
Older, more educated household heads are significantly less likely to buy land than younger, less 
educated household heads. And farms with female household heads are also significantly less 
likely to buy land. Farm assets have a significant, positive (though very small) impact on the 
likelihood of buying land. And holding title significantly increases the likelihood of a household 
buying land (Table 16). As far as the amount of land bought is concerned (Table 17), some of 
the same patterns hold—older household heads and female-headed households buy less land, 
farms with more assets and with titled land buy more land. However, though access to credit for 
inputs did not significantly increase the likelihood of a farm buying land, input credit access 
does significantly increase the amount of land bought. It is interesting to compare the size and 
significance of the estimated impacts of owning land and holding title. The amount of land 
owned has little impact and is not significant, while holding titled land has a relatively large 
positive impact and is significant, both for the likelihood of buying and for the amount bought. 
Clearly, the value of title as collateral in gaining access to the land sales market is important. 
In terms of the supply of rented land in 2001, having secure title to land is a significant 
contributor to renting out land (Table 18) and in the amount of land rented out (Table 19). This 
may be due to the fear of losing land to the tiller being greater without secure title. The more 
land and the fewer assets a farm owns, the more land it is significantly likely to rent out. Less 
educated and older household heads are significantly more likely to rent out land and rent out 
  17significantly more land. Landholders in the Frontier region are significantly more likely to rent 
out land and rent out significantly more land. Those in the Central region are significantly less 
likely to rent out land and rent out significantly less land. Meanwhile, farm households in the 
Colonization region rent out significantly more land. 
Turning to the demand for rented land (Tables 20–23), we see interesting similarities and 
differences between the beginning and end of the decade. In 1991, those farms with secure title 
to land were significantly less likely to rent land and rented significantly less land. In 2001, titled 
landholders rented a significantly greater amount of land. In 1991, neither the number of adults 
in the household nor the amount of land owned were significant contributors to the likelihood of 
renting or the amount of land rented. In 2001, more adults significantly increased the likelihood 
of renting and the amount of land rented, while the amount of land owned by the household 
decreased both the likelihood and amount of rentals significantly. In 1991, the age of the 
household head was not a significant determinant of renting in, but in 2001, older household 
heads were significantly less likely to rent and rented significantly less land. In 2001, female 
household heads were significantly less likely to rent land, though this is not the case for 1991. 
This change may have to do with the increase in the percentage of single female household 
heads in the intervening decade. In both years, access to credit was a significant determinant of 
renting in land. In 2001, input credit was especially important. In 2001, a farm’s assets 
contributed significantly to its participation in the rental market. 
To summarize, participation in land markets in Paraguay is limited, ranging from 1.5% of 
farms for sales to just under 9% for rentals in 2001. The demand side is restricted by a lack of 
access to credit, especially for inputs. This restriction is most strongly felt in the land rental 
market. While the distribution of resources such as land and labor play a part, as well as 
demographic factors, it seems clear that in order to stimulate the demand for land rentals in 
Paraguay, input credit will be required. Assuming for the moment that this could happen, can we 
say that rural poverty will be alleviated significantly?  To help answer this question, I examine 





  187.   TENURE AND INCOME 
 
One of the arguments put forward in favor of land rental markets is that they form part of an 
agricultural ladder, an intermediate rung between agricultural wage labor and land ownership. In 
order for that to be true, tenancy would have to offer a greater chance of saving for future 
purchases of land. In short, household income would need to be significantly higher for tenants 
than for the landless. This section explores the question of land rental’s effects on household 
income. Ideally, panel data on individual farm households over time could be used to a full 
understanding of this issue. Future work will incorporate such data, but for now, I examine the 
relationship between participation in land rental and sales markets and household income in 
2001. 
First, I break down households by tenancy type (see Table 24).
6  Owners are those 
households who own half or more of their operational holdings (or who at least own more land 
than they rent). As we can see, this is the largest group, with 51% of the total, or 1,6700 
households. The next largest group is “loanees.” These households report that half or more of 
their operational holdings are lands loaned to them (cedido). These households constitute 32% 
(1,052) of the total. Next come tenants, those households that hold most of their operational 
holdings as rentals (or at least rent more land than they own). They account for 3% of rural 
households. Squatters are those households that are occupying more than half of their 
operational holdings. “Common” households are those operating more than half of their farms 
on common land. These two groups make up about 1% each of rural households. And finally, 
12% of households own and operate no land at all, making up the third largest group. 
Table 25 reports average land owned and farm size for each of the tenure categories. 
Unsurprisingly, owners own the most land (13.8 Ha., almost twice the overall average) and the 
landless own none. In addition, tenants and those who make use of common lands also own 
substantial amounts of land (2.2 and 4.2 Ha. on average, respectively). The distribution of 
operational holdings among these categories is somewhat surprising. Owners operate less than a 
third of a hectare more than they own, on average, while tenants operate, on average, 16.4 
                                                 
6For this section’s analysis, I remove outliers based on net household income per capita and farm size. I define 
outliers as those households who are outside the range defined by the mean plus or minus five standard deviations. 
This procedure removes seven of the 3,289 rural households in the survey. 
  19hectares. Commoners operate an average of 144 hectares (this is primarily due to one very large 
farm).  
I next examine how household income breaks down by these same categories (see Table 26). 
Looking first at net household income per capita,
7 we see that tenants have the highest overall 
net household income (on average, about 3.24 million G or $879 per person). The landless had 
3.12 million G per person, and owners had 2.13. The main difference between the categories is 
that tenants get 44% of their income from agriculture, while the rest of the rural households’ 
incomes come mostly from off-farm sources. Interestingly, though, tenants get almost as much 
nonfarm income, on average, as owners. “Loanee” farms get the next highest average net 
household income, with 90% of it from off-farm sources. Based on this descriptive analysis, 
tenancy certainly seems to offer advantages, especially in terms of farm income. Although there 
are few tenants in Paraguay, they appear to be doing well as farmers. I now move on to a 
regression analysis to test the significance of the observed impact of tenancy on rural incomes. 
Table 27 gives the summary statistics for the variables I use in the subsequent econometric 
analysis of the impact of tenure on net household, net nonfarm and net farm income per capita. 
The average household head is 46 years old with almost six years of education. Just under one 
out of five household heads are female. Of rural households, 6.9% rented some land, while 2.4% 
were landlords; 1.8% bought land, and 1.1% sold land. Over 30% of households held title to 
land. The average farm size was 11.3 hectares. The greatest concentration (30.7%) of rural 
households was in the Central region, while the Colonization region had the fewest (19.3%). 
I use two models for each income variable. The first uses dummy variables for the 











                                                 
7Defined here as net household income divided by the number of people in the household. 
  20where y is income (net household, net nonfarm, or net farm income per capita), age is the age of 
the household head, educ is the years of education of the household head, female_head is a 
dummy variable for those households with a single female head, Renter, Landlord, Buyer, and 
Seller are the dummy variables for land market participation by the household, AreaOwned is 
the amount of land owned by the household in hectares, AreaOperated is the farm size in 
hectares, and central, frontera, and colonizacion are regional dummy variables. The second 









where AreaRentedIn is the amount of land rented by the household (in hectares), AreaRentedOut 
is the amount of land rented out by the household (in hectares), AreaBought is the amount of 
land bought by the household (in hectares), AreaSold is the amount of land sold by the 
household (in hectares), AreaCedido is the amount of land loaned to the household (in hectares), 
AreaOcupado is the amount of land occupied by the household (in hectares), and all other 
variables are identical to those in the first model.  
For each income variable, Equation 3 proved to be a slightly better model for explaining 
outcomes. Starting with overall net household income per capita, we see that the education of the 
household head significantly improves the household’s fortunes (see Tables 28 and 29). 
Interestingly, both renting land out and the amount of land rented out significantly decrease net 
household income per capita, while renting land in increases it (though not significantly). The 
amount of land owned by the household has a significant positive impact on net household 
income per capita. Households in the Frontier region enjoyed significantly higher incomes, 
while those in the Colonization region had significantly lower incomes.  
Turning to the regressions of nonfarm income, it seems that the benefits of education 
apparently are in its impact on off-farm opportunities—additional years of education for the 
household head significantly increases a household’s nonagricultural income (see Tables 30 and 
31). Both tenants and landlords receive significantly less net nonagricultural income and the 
  21latter decreases significantly with the amount of land rented out or bought by a household. Since 
rental income must increase with the area rented out, this is an interesting result. The more land 
owned by a household, the significantly higher is their nonfarm income. Again, those 
households in the Frontier region got significantly more and those in the Colonization region got 
significantly less nonagricultural income. 
Finally, coming to net agricultural income, we expect to see that greater land ownership and, 
secondarily, access to land via tenancy will increase this share of overall income. Mere 
participation in the sales or rental markets is not estimated to significantly contribute to a farm’s 
agricultural income however (see Tables 32 and 33); nor is the amount of land transacted. 
However, in the second regression, the amount of land owned is estimated to significantly 
increase agricultural income per capita. Although there is statistical evidence to suggest both that 
tenants do better than landless rural households, and even that they are better off in terms of 
overall net household income per capita than land owners, there appears to be no statistically 
significant connection between tenancy and incomes.  
 
8.   CONCLUSION 
 
The single most important result of this study is the strong impact of access to credit for inputs 
on participation in land rental and sales markets. Those farms with input credit rented in over 
seven additional hectares of land. This amount is well above the average rental, indicating that 
lack of access to credit for inputs may be a deal breaker in many cases. This essay confirms that 
the land market situation has not improved since the earlier study by Carter and Galeano (1995). 
In fact, it suggests that the situation is worse for smaller farmers.  
A second significant finding of this essay is that there is little evidence to support the theory 
that tenancy may be a way out of poverty for rural households. The descriptive statistics seem to 
confirm at least one aspect of the argument that the World Bank employs in promoting rental 
markets—that access to land rental improves income-generating possibilities for the small 
peasants and landless farm laborers (Deininger 2003). However, there is no significant positive 
relationship between any measure of participation in rental markets and household income, the 
only significant relationship is negative!  A likely interpretation is that the apparent benefits of 
tenancy are not accruing to those households on the bottom. Instead, a very small number of 
  22medium-sized farms that rent in large parcels of land are seeing the benefits. More detailed study 
of the distribution of rentals and income among households will be required to clarify this 
question. What is clear is that land ownership is superior to tenancy, at least in the scope of this 
study.  
From previous work (Masterson and Rao 1999), we know that smaller farms are more 
productive in the measure that makes the most sense for Paraguay (with its rural poverty, highly 
skewed distribution of land, and lack of nonfarm rural or urban employment opportunities): 
output per hectare of operated land. From this study, we conclude that evidence does not 
support, and in fact contradicts, the idea that tenancy can improve the lot of the rural poor. And 
we have seen that an important prerequisite for the land rental market to operate on the demand 
side is the availability of credit for agricultural inputs. But credit has dried up in Paraguay since 
the process of liberalization got under way at the end of the 1980s, and this has meant that the 
smallest peasants have lost out; credit, where available, goes to the large, well-connected farms. 
This lack of credit availability may explain the apparent disadvantage that tenancy seems to 
carry with it—without credit, farm income generation is more difficult. 
If the rental market is to have the redistributive effects that are claimed for it, it is clear that 
the lack of credit available to those most in need, the smallest farmers, must be remedied. Two 
remedies exist. The first, increasing state intervention in rural credit markets seems highly 
unlikely, given the class composition of Paraguay’s government (large landowners, cattlemen, 
etc.), even if there were no external pressure for fiscal austerity. The second, that a functioning 
financial market that does not skim the benefits of access to land off the top could miraculously 
appear seems even more unlikely. In this context, the fact that the World Bank encourages fiscal 
austerity while simultaneously acting as a booster for the land markets as the means for land 
redistribution and poverty reduction calls into question either the World Bank’s analysis or its 
intentions. At the very least it is myopic. Deininger, Zagarra, and Lavadenz (2003) devote one 
short line on the possible impact of credit on the rural land markets, but they do not attempt to 
estimate its impact on the Nicaraguan land market, though they use survey data similar to the 
MECOVI dataset.  
Even if we accept that rental markets are the way to go, they will require almost as much 
state intervention as land sales markets or expropriation and redistribution would have taken to 
be effective. If this is the case, why rely on markets to redistribute land at all?  
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Figure 2: Ownership Distribution of Land, 1991 
 
 
   
  24 





Figure 4: Ownership Distribution of Land, 2001 
 
 
   


















   
 















  29TABLES 
 
Table 1: Ownership and Operational Land Gini Coefficients, Region Oriental, 1991 and 
2001 
 
Year   Ownership Operational
1991 .944 .901
2001 .862 .847
Source: Censo Agropecuario 1991 and MECOVI 2001  
 
Table 2: Number of Farms by Region and Year 
 
  Year 
Region  1991 2001 Total
Central (#)  573 777 1,350
% of Year  20 28 24
Minifundia (#)  789 638 1,427
% of Year  27 23 25
Colonizacion (#)  780 637 1,417
% of Year  27 23 25
Frontera (#)  785 753 1,538
% of Year  27 27 27
Total (#)  2,927 2,805 5,732
% of Year  100 100 100
Source: Censo Agropecuario 1991 and MECOVI 2001  
  
 
  30Table 3: Median and Maximum Farm Size (in hectares) by Region and Year 
 











Source: Censo Agropecuario 1991 and MECOVI 2001  
  
 
Table 4: Median and Maximum Area Owned (in hectares) by Region and Year 
 











 Source: Censo Agropecuario 1991 and MECOVI 2001  
 
 
  31Table 5: Number and Average Size of Land Rented In (in hectares) by Region and Year 
 











Source: Censo Agropecuario 1991 and MECOVI 2001  
  
 
Table 6: Number and Average Size of Transactions (in hectares) by Region, 2001 
 
Region   Rented Out Bought Sold
Central 3 10 9
 1.4 6.1 1.6
Minifundia 23 24 11
 4 3.7 3.2
Colonizacion 7 15 11
 25 4 2
Frontera 35 24 11
 6.4 14 3.3
Total 68 73 42
 5.2 7.6 18
Source: MECOVI 2001  
 
  32Table 7: Number of Farms by Farm Size (Operated Area) and Year 
 
  Year 
Farm Size  1991 2001 Total
Less than 1 ha. (#)  294 737 1,031
% of Year  10 25 17
>=1 to <5 ha. (#)  903 754 1,657
% of Year  30 26 28
>=5 to <10 ha. (#)  661 574 1,235
% of Year  22 20 21
>=10 to <20 ha. (#)  695 529 1,223
% of Year  23 18 21
>=20 to <50 ha. (#)  276 217 493
% of Year  9 7 8
>=50 to <100 ha. (#)  74 54 128
% of Year  2 2 2
>=100 to <200 ha. (#)  37 25 62
% of Year  1 1 1
>=200 to <500 ha. (#)  26 14 40
% of Year  1 0 1
>=500 to <1,000 ha. (#)  6 12 18
% of Year  0 0 0
>1,000 ha. (#)  24 5 29
% of Year  1 0 0
Total (#)  2,994 2,922 5,916
% of Year  100 100 100
Source: Censo Agropecuario 1991 and MECOVI 2001  
  
 
  33Table 8: Number of Rentals and Average Size of Land Rented In by Farm Size Category 
and Year 
 
Farm Size   1991 2001
Less than 1 ha.  261 59
 4.35 72.5
>=1 to <5 ha.  56 71
 2.07 2.26
>=5 to <10 ha.  17 47
 2.63 3.19
>=10 to <20 ha.  17 44
 2.9 11.8
>=20 to <50 ha.  14 17
 7.54 29
>=50 to <100 ha.  7 5
 36.6 18.6
>=100 to <200 ha.  3 0
 67 .
>=200 to <500 ha.  0 2
 . 154
>=500 to <1,000 ha.  1 0
 600 .




Source: Censo Agropecuario 1991 and MECOVI 2001  
  
 
  34Table 9: Percent of Farms Renting In Land (Participation Rate) by Farm Size Category 
and Year 
 
Farm Size   1991 2001
Less than 1 ha.  49.06 10.59
>=1 to <5 ha.  7.41 8.90
>=5 to <10 ha.  2.78 8.48
>=10 to <20 ha.  2.53 7.65
>=20 to <50 ha.  5.15 6.44
>=50 to <100 ha.  9.72 7.35
>=100 to <200 ha.  8.33 0.00
>=200 to <500 ha.  0.00 7.41
>=500 to <1,000 ha.  14.29 0.00
>1,000 ha.  0.00 0.00
Total 12.51 8.72




  35Table 10: Number and Average Size of Transactions by Farm Size Category, 2001 
 
Farm Size   Rented Out Purchases Sales
Less than 1 ha.  0 15 3
 . 2.04 .333
>=1 to <5 ha.  4 15 5
 1.56 4 .832
>=5 to <10 ha.  19 17 11
 2.07 2.99 1.32
>=10 to <20 ha.  22 14 12
 4.03 11.2 5.17
>=20 to <50 ha.  18 10 7
 7.57 6.96 7.58
>=50 to <100 ha.  4 0 2
 19.4 . 59.2
>=100 to <200 ha.  0 2 2
 . 23.2 23.9
>=200 to <500 ha.  1 3 2
 30 40.2 26.6
>=500 to <1,000 
ha. 
011
 .4 82 4
>1,000 ha.  0 0 1
 . . 700
Total 68 77 46
 5.23 7.86 18
Source: MECOVI 2001  
  
 
  36Table 11: Participation Rates by Farm Size Category, 2001 
 
Farm Size   Rented Out Purchases Sales
Less than 1 ha.  0 2.74 .549
>=1 to <5 ha.  .515 1.93 .644
>=5 to <10 ha.  3.26 2.92 1.89
>=10 to <20 ha.  3.52 2.24 1.92
>=20 to <50 ha.  6.71 3.73 2.61
>=50 to <100 ha.  5.7 0 2.85
>=100 to <200 ha.  0 5.1 5.1
>=200 to <500 ha.  4 12 7.99
>=500 to <1,000 ha.  0 9.5 9.5
>1,000 ha.  0 0 5.22
Total 2.18 2.59 1.47
Source: MECOVI 2001  
 
Table 12: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables for 1991  
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Land Owned (has.)  30.42  366.99 
Farm Size (has.)  33.76  367.53 
Tenants (%)  12.55  33.14 
Land Rented In (has.)  0.84  11.74 
Number of Adult HH 
Members 
2.74 1.56 
Age of HH Head  45.19  16.7 
Education of HH Head 
(Years) 
4.16 2.56 
Female-headed HHs (%)  9.67  29.56 
Credit (% receiving)  34  47.38 
Farm Assets (millions G)  0.21  1.77 
Titled land (% holding)  60.12  48.97 
Minifundia Region (%)  26.89  44.35 
Frontier Region (%)  26.72  44.26 
Colonization Region (%)  26.72  44.26 
Central Region (%)  19.67  39.76 
N 2979 
Source: Censo Agropecuario 1991 
 
 
  37Table 13: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables for 2001  
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  N 
Land Owned (has.)  8.65  43.21  2727 
Farm Size (has.)  14.56  74.78  2727 
Sellers (%)  1.38  11.66  2727 
Land Sold (has.)  0.24  9.06  2727 
Buyers (%)  2.21  14.71  2727 
Land Bought (has.)  0.17  2.55  2727 
Tenants (%)  8.48  27.86  2727 
Land Rented In (has.)  2.04  46.64  2727 
Landlords (%)  2.92  16.84  2727 
Land Rented Out (has.)  0.15  1.39  2727 
Number of Adult HH Members  2.58  1.18  2727 
Age of HH Head  48.47  15.51  2727 
Education of HH Head (Years)  5.43  3.57  2727 
Female-headed HHs (%)  19.85  39.89  2727 
Credit (% receiving)  8.44  27.8  2727 
Land Credit (% receiving)  0.01  0.94  2727 
Input Credit (% receiving)  8.27  27.55  2727 
Equipment Credit (% 
receiving) 
0.27 5.16  2727 
Animal Credit (% receiving)  0.02  1.46  2727 
Farm Assets (millions G)  2.28  16.32  2727 
Titled land (% holding)  36.7  48.21  2727 
Minifundia Region (%)  22.76  41.94  2727 
Frontier Region (%)  26.83  44.32  2727 
Colonization Region (%)  22.71  41.9  2727 
Central Region (%)  27.7  44.76  2727 




  38Table 14: Logit Regression of Likelihood of Selling Land, 2001  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
numadult -0.096  (0.183) 
preOW  0.007∗ (0.003) 
age 0.006  (0.015) 
educ -0.024  (0.073) 
female_head 0.064  (0.584) 
input_credit -0.916  (0.755) 
farmAssets -0.018  (0.013) 
Titled -0.512  (0.431) 
front 0.031  (0.522) 
colon 0.559  (0.505) 
cent -0.360  (0.574) 




F (11,315)   1.545∗∗





  39Table 15: Tobit Regression of Land Sold, 2001  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
numadult -3.372  (3.911) 
preOW  0.523∗∗ (0.080) 
age 0.058  (0.327) 
educ -1.710  (1.483) 
female_head 12.759  (10.732) 
input_credit  -48.300∗ (22.124) 
farmAssets  -2.066∗∗ (0.609) 
Titled -14.118  (9.733) 
front  32.405∗ (14.459) 
colon  70.402∗∗ (13.997) 
cent  35.844∗ (14.596) 
Intercept  -145.305∗∗ (30.770) 




F (11,1741)   95.180∗∗




  40Table 16: Logit Regression of Likelihood of Buying Land, 2001  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
numadult -0.212  (0.166) 
preOW 0.001  (0.001) 
age  -0.022∗ (0.009) 
educ  -0.078† (0.044) 
female_head  -1.033∗ (0.457) 
input_credit 0.214  (0.539) 
capital_credit 0.603  (1.535) 
farmAssets  0.005† (0.003) 
Titled  1.146∗∗ (0.363) 
front -0.189  (0.357) 
colon 0.272  (0.478) 
cent  -1.144∗ (0.518) 




F (12,324)   3.139∗∗




  41Table 17: Tobit Regression of Land Bought, 2001  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
numadult -1.661  (1.375) 
PreOW 0.007  (0.018) 
Age  -0.246∗ (0.120) 
educ -0.376  (0.475) 
female_head  -8.590† (5.000) 
land_credit 45.281  (44.275) 
input_credit  7.585† (3.937) 
capital_credit 3.550  (17.130) 
farmAssets  0.109∗ (0.046) 
Titled  13.930∗∗ (3.245) 
front  12.610∗∗ (3.901) 
colon  18.509∗∗ (4.067) 
cent 2.496  (4.941) 
Intercept  -46.398∗∗ (8.377) 




F (13,2714)   92.353∗∗





  42Table 18: Logit Regression of Likelihood of Renting Out, 2001  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
numadult -0.147  (0.147) 
AreaOwned 0.004  (0.003) 
age  0.019† (0.011) 
educ  -0.127∗ (0.057) 
female_head 0.016  (0.434) 
input_credit 0.041  (0.585) 
farmAssets -0.014  (0.014) 
Titled  1.037∗∗ (0.353) 
front  1.541∗∗ (0.431) 
colon 0.184  (0.551) 
cent  -2.779∗∗ (0.812) 




F (11,315)   6.274∗∗




  43Table 19: Tobit Regression of Land Rented Out, 2001  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
numadult -0.835  (0.791) 
AreaOwned  0.048∗ (0.023) 
age  0.165∗ (0.073) 
educ  -0.814∗ (0.365) 
female_head 3.336  (2.276) 
input_credit 1.070  (2.654) 
farmAssets  -0.264† (0.153) 
Titled  9.829∗∗ (2.368) 
front  21.617∗∗ (3.320) 
colon  11.138∗∗ (3.234) 
cent  -12.973† (6.748) 
Intercept  -48.084∗∗ (7.409) 




F (11,1754)   168.719∗∗




  44Table 20: Logit Regression of Likelihood of Renting In, 1991  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
numadult -0.008  (0.046) 
AreaOwned -0.002  (0.002) 
age -0.003  (0.004) 
educ  0.044† (0.024) 
female_head -0.198  (0.227) 
credit  0.425∗∗ (0.124) 
farmAssets 0.024  (0.034) 
Titled  -1.609∗∗ (0.131) 
front 0.139  (0.162) 
colon 0.228  (0.160) 
cent 0.195  (0.176) 











  45Table 21: Tobit Regression of Land Rented In, 1991  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
numadult -0.445  (0.896) 
AreaOwned 0.001  (0.004) 
age 0.011  (0.086) 
educ  0.963∗ (0.480) 
female_head -5.515  (4.496) 
credit  8.322∗∗ (2.497) 
farmAssets 0.464  (0.652) 
Titled  -26.135∗∗ (2.641) 
front  6.483∗ (3.223) 
colon 4.419  (3.252) 
cent 2.983  (3.551) 
Intercept  -44.200∗∗ (5.456) 




F (11,2968)   151.307∗∗




  46Table 22: Logit Regression of Liklelihood of Renting In, 2001  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
Numadult  0.235∗∗ (0.073) 
AreaOwned  -0.029∗∗ (0.010) 
Age  -0.020∗∗ (0.006) 
Educ -0.047  (0.030) 
female_head  -0.667∗ (0.272) 
input_credit  0.636∗ (0.275) 
capital_credit  1.908† (1.044) 
farmAssets  0.051∗∗ (0.017) 
Titled -0.061  (0.207) 
front 0.104  (0.267) 
colon -0.113  (0.286) 
cent  -0.987∗∗ (0.366) 




F (12,324)   5.099∗∗




  47Table 23: Tobit Regression of Land Rented In, 2001  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
numadult  7.829∗∗ (1.675) 
AreaOwned  -2.738∗∗ (0.080) 
age  -0.542∗∗ (0.163) 
educ -0.895  (0.640) 
female_head -8.638  (5.862) 
input_credit  21.607∗∗ (5.595) 
capital_credit 33.270  (26.489) 
farmAssets  4.689∗∗ (0.091) 
Titled  11.524∗∗ (4.327) 
front  25.973∗∗ (5.012) 
colon  24.559∗∗ (5.244) 
cent 1.192  (6.077) 
Intercept  -73.501∗∗ (9.952) 




F (12,2715)   792.141∗∗
Source: MECOVI 2001 
  
Table 24: Distribution of Rural Households by Tenure 
 








Source: MECOVI 2001  
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Table 25: Average Land Owned and Operated (hectares) by Tenure 
 








Source: MECOVI 2001  
  
Table 26: Average Net Household Income, Net Nonagricultural Income and Net 
Agricultural Income per Capita (millions G) by Tenure 
  
Tenure Household  Nonfarm  Farm 
Owner  2.88 2.03 0.85 
 0.79  0.72  -0.09 
Gifted    1.93 1.73 0.19 
 0.65  0.72  -0.06 
Tenant   11.24  1.78  9.47 
 0.88  0.70  -0.03 
Squatter   0.87  0.92  -0.05 
 0.46  0.27  -0.20 
Common   0.86  1.05  -0.20 
  0.62 0.29 0.12 
Landless   3.12  3.23  -0.10 
 1.96    1.96  0.00 
Total    2.86 2.13 0.73 
  0.98 0.93 0.00 
Source: MECOVI 2001  
 
  49Table 27: Summary Statistics for Income Regressions  
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Net Household Income (millions G)  2.25  8.27 
Net Nonfarm Income (millions G)  2.07  5.27 
Net Farm Income (millions G)  0.18  4.61 
Age of Household Head  46.64  15.68 
Education of HH Head (years)  5.84  3.83 
Female-Headed HHs (%)  19.63  39.73 
Renters (%)  6.87  25.3 
Landlords (%)  2.39  15.28 
Buyers (%)  1.84  13.46 
Sellers (%)  1.14  10.64 
Title (% holding)  30.42  46.01 
Land Rented In (has.)  0.52  7.82 
Land Rented Out (has.)  0.13  1.26 
Land Bought (has.)  0.15  2.51 
Land Sold (has.)  0.12  2.66 
Land Owned (has.)  7.26  37.03 
Farm Size (has.)  11.29  54.81 
Land Occupied (has.)  0.06  0.76 
Central Region (%)  30.67  46.12 
Frontier Region (%)  27.52  44.67 
Colonization Region (%)  19.33  39.49 
Minifundia Region (%)  20.17  40.14 
N 3282 
Source: MECOVI 2001  
  
  50 Table 28: Survey Regression of Net Household Income per Capita  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
age -0.002  (0.011) 
educ  0.267∗∗ (0.051) 
female_head -0.198  (0.237) 
Renter 0.150  (0.620) 
Landlord  -1.756∗ (0.735) 
Buyer 4.717  (4.158) 
Seller -0.778  (0.940) 
Titled -0.079  (0.344) 
AreaOwned  0.059† (0.031) 
AreaOperated 0.031  (0.021) 
central 0.470  (0.363) 
frontera  1.190∗ (0.571) 
colonizacion  -0.616† (0.341) 




F (13,359)   6.907∗∗




  51Table 29: Survey Regression of Net Household Income per Capita  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
age -0.002  (0.010) 
educ  0.258∗∗ (0.050) 
female_head -0.255  (0.238) 
AreaRentedIn 0.139  (0.089) 
AreaRentedOut  -0.225† (0.120) 
AreaBought 0.000  (0.139) 
AreaSold -0.031  (0.034) 
AreaOwned  0.089∗∗ (0.022) 
AreaOperated 0.001  (0.002) 
AreaCedido 0.044  (0.040) 
AreaOcupado -0.082  (0.051) 
central 0.488  (0.354) 
frontera  1.103∗ (0.547) 
colonizacion  -0.587† (0.344) 




F (14,359)   7.226∗∗




  52Table 30: Survey Regression of Net Nonagricultural Income per Capita  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
age -0.001  (0.007) 
educ  0.229∗∗ (0.039) 
female_head -0.238  (0.199) 
Renter  -0.416† (0.212) 
Landlord  -1.385∗∗ (0.483) 
Buyer 0.913  (1.410) 
Seller -0.587  (0.786) 
Titled -0.227  (0.235) 
AreaOwned  0.054∗ (0.023) 
AreaOperated 0.009  (0.006) 
central 0.366  (0.287) 
frontera 0.571  (0.349) 
colonizacion  -0.784∗∗ (0.242) 




F (13,359)   9.204∗∗




  53Table 31: Survey Regression of Net Nonagricultural Income per Capita  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
age -0.003  (0.006) 
educ  0.224∗∗ (0.037) 
female_head -0.223  (0.204) 
AreaRentedIn 0.001  (0.011) 
AreaRentedOut  -0.182† (0.095) 
AreaBought  -0.169† (0.094) 
AreaSold -0.019  (0.025) 
AreaOwned  0.065∗∗ (0.021) 
AreaOperated 0.001  (0.001) 
AreaCedido 0.014  (0.011) 
AreaOcupado  -0.087∗∗ (0.030) 
central 0.396  (0.284) 
frontera  0.586† (0.350) 
colonizacion  -0.786∗∗ (0.240) 




F (14,359)   9.505∗∗




  54Table 32: Survey Regression of Net Agricultural Income per Capita  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
age -0.002  (0.005) 
educ 0.038  (0.023) 
female_head 0.040  (0.103) 
Renter 0.566  (0.550) 
Landlord -0.370  (0.365) 
Buyer 3.803  (3.020) 
Seller -0.191  (0.393) 
Titled 0.148  (0.191) 
AreaOwned 0.005  (0.017) 
AreaOperated 0.023  (0.016) 
central 0.105  (0.189) 
frontera  0.619† (0.337) 
colonizacion 0.167  (0.179) 




F (13,359)   3.592∗∗




  55Table 33: Survey Regression of Net Agricultural Income per Capita  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
age 0.001  (0.005) 
educ 0.034  (0.024) 
female_head -0.032  (0.111) 
AreaRentedIn 0.138  (0.086) 
AreaRentedOut -0.043  (0.043) 
AreaBought 0.170  (0.103) 
AreaSold -0.012  (0.011) 
AreaOwned  0.025∗∗ (0.005) 
AreaOperated 0.000  (0.001) 
AreaCedido 0.031  (0.029) 
AreaOcupado 0.006  (0.028) 
central 0.092  (0.176) 
frontera  0.517† (0.311) 
colonizacion 0.200  (0.180) 




F (14,359)   3.611∗∗
Source: MECOVI 2001 
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